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CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: A COMMENT ON THE
DECISIONS DURING THE 1988-89 TERM
Erwin Chemerinsky*
INTRODUCTION

For the past decade, the eleventh amendment has received constant attention from law professors and judges. Major articles have regularly appeared
on the subject by prominent scholars in the most prestigious law reviews.'
The Supreme Court has decided several important eleventh amendment cases
during the 1980's. 2 In fact, in the 1988-89 Supreme Court Term alone, there
were five cases that presented issues concerning the scope and meaning of
the eleventh amendment. 3
Why has there been so much attention to this constitutional provision that
probably few people even know about? First, I suggest that the focus on
the eleventh amendment reflects the unsatisfactory state of the law in this

* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Jackson, The Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); L. Marshall,
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1342 (1989); W. Marshall,
The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HAXv. L. REV.
1372 (1989); Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 61 (1989); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case,
98 HARv. L. REV. 61 (1984).
2. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (Congress did
not express in unmistakable statutory language an intention to allow suits against states under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (eleventh
amendment bars suits against a state for unremedied past breach of trust because such relief is
equivalent to award of monetary damages); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (eleventh
amendment bars claims against a state for "notice relief" and declaratory judgment, as
retrospective relief, for past violations of federal law); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985) (congressional intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity must be expressed
in clear and unmistakable statutory language); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment bars pendent state law claims against state officers in
federal court).
3. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989), infra
notes 51-56 and accompanying text; Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989), infra notes
57-60 and accompanying text; Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989), infra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text; Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), infra notes
61-67 and accompanying text; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989), infra
notes 30-44 and accompanying text. These cases are discussed in Part I of this Article.
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area. The Supreme Court's desire to protect state sovereignty while still
assuring state compliance with the Constitution and federal law has caused
it to create many fictions and questionable distinctions. For example, a state
government may not be sued in federal court, but its officers acting in their
official capacity may be sued for injunctive relief, though not for money
damages. 4 Suits against state officers that cause the state to spend money
are allowed if the relief is prospective, but not if it is retroactive., State
officers can be sued in federal court on federal claims, but pendent state
law causes of action are not permitted. 6 The eleventh amendment is treated
as a restriction on subject matter jurisdiction, but nonetheless a state can
waive its immunity from suit.' Together these rulings have created a set of
legal doctrines that are regarded by virtually everyone as unsatisfactory.
Numerous scholars have offered solutions and the Court continues to struggle
with the eleventh amendment.
Second, the attention paid to the eleventh amendment is a product of its
relationship to major themes of constitutional law. The eleventh amendment
bears directly on federalism, separation of powers, and the protection of
fundamental rights. Specifically, because it determines the ability of federal
courts to hear suits against state governments, the eleventh amendment is
crucial to defining the content of American federalism. Moreover, as the
decisions from this Term illustrate, the question of congressional power to
override the eleventh amendment raises issues concerning the allocation of
power between Congress, the federal courts, and the states. Perhaps most
important, central to the eleventh amendment decisions is the tension between
safeguarding state sovereignty and assuring state compliance with the Con-

4. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 n.10 (1989)
(describing distinction between suits for injunctions and damages when state officers are sued
in their official capacity), infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text; see also, Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permitting suits against state officers for injunctive relief).
5. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974) (articulating the distinction
between retroactive and prospective relief). In Edelman, the Court held that the eleventh
amendment bars an award of retroactive benefits for welfare and disability payments wrongfully
withheld by the state because a judgment that state payment rules were inconsistent with federal
regulations may only be given prospective effect. Id. More recently, the Supreme Court has
stated,
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action
of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred
even when the state official is the named defendant ....
On the other hand, relief
that serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not
barred by the eleventh amendment even though accompanied by a substantial
ancillary effect on the state treasury.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (citing Miliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90
(1977) and Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68).
6. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (federal courts
may not hear pendent state law claims against state officers).
7. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (states may
waive their eleventh amendment immunity).
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stitution. As Professors Low and Jeffries explain: "The stakes involved in
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment are very high. Virtually the entire class
of modern civil rights litigation plausibly might be barred by an expansive
reading of the immunity of the states from suit in federal court.",
In this Article, I wish to examine the Supreme Court's most recent eleventh
amendment decisions from both of these perspectives: considering the extent
to which they added clarity or exacerbated the muddle, and discussing the
impact of the decisions on underlying themes of constitutional law. Specifically, the analysis is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly summarizes the
recent decisions and describes how they altered the law of the eleventh
amendment. Part II suggests that the cases have added yet more confusion
to an already incoherent set of doctrines; in fact, because of an unusual
compromise the Court announced a rule that is inconsistent with the views
of at least eight of the Justices. Finally, Part III argues that this Term's
decisions have troubling implications for both separation of powers and
federalism. Ultimately, the issue in interpreting the eleventh amendment is
the proper balance between state sovereign immunity and constitutional
enforcement by federal courts. However, the approach of both the majority
and the dissent obscures this question and thus frustrates coherent analysis.
Thus, this Article has a limited scope. 9 The focus is on the Court's recent
decisions and how they illuminate the larger difficulties in the law concerning
the eleventh amendment. The legal principles in this area are simply a mess.
I do not seek to solve the problem, but rather, partially explain how it got
this way. Any solution, be it allowing more state liability or less, depends
ort altering the Court's method of interpreting the eleventh amendment.
Analysis based on parsing the textual provision and discerning its Framers'
intent is unhelpful; instead, eleventh amendment doctrines must rest on
explicit value judgments about the proper place of sovereign immunity and
constitutional enforcement in the American system of government.
I.

THE RECENT DECISIONS AND THEIR LIKELY IMPACT

The eleventh amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign state."' 1 Although the text of the
provision refers only to suits against a state by citizens of other states or
countries, the Supreme Court has held since Hans v. Louisiana that the
eleventh amendment also precludes a state from being sued by its own

8. P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
780 (1987).
9. For a broader description of the history of the eleventh amendment and a discussion

of the law concerning it, see E. CHEMERINSKY,
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

323-68 (1989).
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citizens in federal court." Many scholars have criticized Hans and argued
that it should be overruled because it is inconsistent with the text and history
surrounding the adoption of the eleventh amendment. 12 Other professors
have defended the decision. 13 In 1987, in Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways & Public Transportation,'4 the Supreme Court split four-to-four
on the question of whether Hans should be overruled. Justice Scalia, the
ninth Justice participating in the decision, voted that the eleventh amendment
barred the action in Welch, but did not reach the question of whether Hans

should be reversed because the issue had neither been briefed nor argued."
The five cases presenting eleventh amendment issues to the Supreme Court
during the 1988-89 Term all involved the question of Congress' ability to

impose liability on state governments. In 1976, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 16 the
Court held that states could be sued in federal court, even for money
damages, pursuant to federal laws that had been adopted under section 5 of

the fourteenth amendment. Fitzpatrickinvolved a suit brought directly against
a state government for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

which prohibits employment discrimination. 7 The Supreme Court reasoned
that the fourteenth amendment was intended to limit state sovereignty, and

therefore Congressional legislation under the fourteenth amendment can
authorize suits directly against the states in federal court.'
Subsequently, in Hutto v. Finney, ' 9 the Supreme Court held that states
may be sued for attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988 of the federal

code, 20 a statute allowing successful plaintiffs in civil rights cases to recover

11. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans, the Court held that a state cannot, without its consent, be
sued in a federal court, even in cases where jurisdiction would be based upon a federal question.

The issue whether Hans should be overruled continues to spark controversy among Supreme
Court Justices. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1087-91 (because Hans, if read broadly, would have
made implementing the Civil War amendments virtually impossible, the Supreme Court adapted
the legal fiction that distinguished between a state and its officers to the eleventh amendment);
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 70 ("the rationale of [Hans], if not the result, should be regarded as
an unforced error-a choice that was neither required nor fruitful. Had it not been made, the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity could far more readily have yielded to federal interests
when those interests properly required action by the federal courts.") (footnote omitted).
13. See, e.g., W. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1375 (arguing that proponents of the diversity
theory have not established "proper historical understanding" that would subject states to
"federal question suits for monetary relief in federal court.").
14. 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor concurred in his opinion); id. at 519-21,
519 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hans should be overruled). Justice Brennan
was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 496.
15. 483 U.S. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
16. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
18. 427 U.S. at 456 (quoting section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which authorizes
Congress to enforce it "by appropriate legislation"). The Court stated, "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citation omitted).
19. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). The issue in Hutto concerned the award of attorney's fees in
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attorneys' fees. Despite the absence of an explicit authorization of suits
against states in that statute, the Court said attorneys' fees against states
are appropriate because of clear congressional intent to include states and
because of statutory language that seemingly allows attorneys' fees to be
22
awarded against all defendants. 2 ' In Quern v. Jordan and in Atascadero
23
State Hospital v. Scanlon, however, the Supreme Court limited the circumstances in which federal statutes may authorize relief against state governments in federal court. In Quern, the Supreme Court held that states cannot
24
be sued in federal court pursuant to section 1983 of the federal code.

litigation involving prisoners' civil rights. See id. at 681-85 & nn.2-7 (describing thirteen years
of litigation and the "dark and evil world completely alien to the free world," Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), underlying claims that prison conditions violated the
eighth and fourteenth amendments).
20. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)
(authorizing federal courts to award prevailing parties reasonable attorney's fees in suits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and certain other statutes).
In Hutto, the Supreme Court held that the district court's award of attorney's fees was
ancillary to the prospective relief afforded by an injunction as well as analogous to fines which
enforce a civil contempt ruling. 437 U.S. at 689-93. Moreover, the district court's award of
attorney's fees was firmly grounded on the defendants' bad faith. Id. at 689 n.14 (citing
Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) and Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). The Supreme Court, noting that the Eighth Circuit's
award of fees for the appeal was grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1988, stated that "[tihe Act ...
applies to 'any' action brought to enforce certain civil rights laws." Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). In addition, the Act contains no exceptions for the states.
"[T]he Act primarily applies to laws passed specifically to restrain state action." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Moreover, the legislative history was "plain." Id. "Of course, the l1th
Amendment is not a bar to the awarding of counsel fees against state governments. Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer [427 U.S. 445 (1976)]." H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7, n.14 (1976),
quoted in Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694.
21. 437 U.S. 678, 693-98. In response to the state's argument that Congress had not enacted
sufficiently express statutory language, the Court stated that the award of fees was " 'as part
of the costs.' Costs have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity." Id. at 695 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). The state's argument
failed, and the Court concluded, "lilt is much too late to single out attorney's fees as the one
kind of litigation cost whose recovery may not be authorized by Congress without an express
statutory waiver of the States' immunity." Id. at 698.
22. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Quern involved later proceedings after Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974), supra note 5 and accompanying text. On remand in Edelman, the district
court ordered state welfare officials to send notices to recipients indicating that they had been
wrongfully denied benefits to be sent with a form to be used to initiate an administrative appeal
for benefits. See Jordan v. Trainor, 405 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Il1. 1975). The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed because the form of the notice would have violated the eleventh
amendment in that it purported to assert claims against the state treasury. See Jordan v. Trainor,
563 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1977). At issue in the Supreme Court in Quern was the court of appeal's
alternative notice which would have simply informed "class members that their federal suit is
at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there are
existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue." Quern, 440 U.S. at
349.
23. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 39:321

Section 1983 is the basic federal civil rights law, creating an action against
those acting under color of state law who violate the Constitution or federal
laws. The Court, in Quern, ruled that although section 1983 was adopted
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, there was insufficient indication of an express congressional desire to make state governments liable
under that statute.

25

In Atascadero, the Court refused to allow suits against states pursuant to
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26 There was strong evidence from the legislative history that Congress intended for the states to be liable under the
Act. Nonetheless, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, refused to allow a
suit against the state of California on the grounds that Congress had not
been sufficiently explicit concerning its desire to make states liable in federal
court. 2 The Court stated: "We . . .affirm that Congress may abrogate the
States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. ' 28
Following these decisions, several questions remained about the relationship of Congress' power and the eleventh amendment. 29 For example, which
statutes adopted under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment are sufficiently
specific in creating state liability so as to override the eleventh amendment?
Furthermore, may Congress by express language override the eleventh amendment only based on the fourteenth amendment or may it do so based on
any of its legislative powers?
The Supreme Court's five decisions concerning the eleventh amendment
during the 1988-89 Term partially resolved these questions. Perhaps the most
important of the cases was Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.a0 The specific issue
before the Supreme Court was whether states could be sued for monetary
damages in federal court pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 3' as

25. 440 U.S. at 345 (text of section 1983 lacks explicit and clear indication of intent "to
sweep away the immunity of the States" and the legislative history is not focused upon state
liability nor upon congressional consideration of, and decision regarding, such liability).
26. 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Scanlon
was a handicapped individual who asserted that state agencies had discriminated against him
in employment in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 129 U.S.C. § 794. 473
U.S. at 236. Section 505 of the Act provides for remedies for violations of section 504 "by
any recipient of Federal assistance." 92 Stat. 2982, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
27. 473 U.S. at 242. "States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid. A
general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language
sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 246.
28. Id. at 242.
29. These questions are discussed in greater detail in E. CHEMIERNSKY, supra note 9, at 36566 (also questioning whether suits brought directly under the fourteenth amendment override
the eleventh amendment).
30. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). For a discussion of the importance of the case, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision, see Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J.
601, 601-02 (1989) (Union Gas involves some of the most debated and intellectually compromised
doctrine under the Constitution, interpreting the eleventh amendment).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982).
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amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"). 3 2 To decide this issue, the Supreme Court needed to resolve two
questions: (1) does the statute authorize suits against states in federal court;
and, (2) if so, does Congress, when legislating pursuant to the commerce
clause, have the authority to create such state government liability?3
The Court answered both questions affirmatively. However, the Court did
so without a majority opinion and was very splintered. Four JusticesJustices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens-concluded that the
statute permits suits against states34 and that Congress may authorize such
litigation under its commerce power. a5 Not surprisingly, these are the same
four Justices who narrowly interpret the eleventh amendment as preventing
federal court suits against states only when jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship. These Justices do not believe that the eleventh amendment
36
precludes suits against states when jurisdiction rests on a federal question.
More specifically, in Union Gas, these Justices said that CERCLA expressly defines "persons" to include states, and other parts of the statute
explicitly exclude states where Congress wanted to protect them from liability.37 As such, the Justices held that "the language of CERCLA as
amended by SARA clearly evinces an intent to hold States liable in damages
38
in federal court."
Three Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy-concluded that CERCLA did not expressly authorize suits against
state governments 39 and that even if it did, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because Congress could not override the eleventh amendment pur-

32. 100 Stat. 1613 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
33. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
34. Id. at 2280 (Congress intended to permit suits brought by private citizens against the
state under CERCLA). Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in his opinion.
35. Id. at 2281 (Congress may abrogate states' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant
to the plenary powers granted it by the Constitution).
36. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 252-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(reliance on the constitutional policy that federal courts ought not to hear suits brought by
individuals against states reverses the role of federal courts of interpreting the will of Congress
in federal question cases). Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's
dissent. Id. at 247.
37. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278 ("The express inclusion of States within the statute's
definition of 'persons,' and the plain statement that States are to be considered 'owners or
operators' in all but narrow circumstances, together convey a message of unmistakable clarity:
Congress intended that States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable
under CERCLA.").
38. Id. at 2280.
39. Id. at 2289 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that CERCLA did not
authorize suits against state governments). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy agreed with Justice White on the issue of state immunity under CERCLA and SARA.
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suant to its commerce power.4 Justice White agreed with the dissenters that
this statute was not sufficiently specific to permit state governments to be
sued in federal court. He reasoned that federal courts lacked jurisdiction
because CERCLA "did not include an 'unmistakable' declaration of abro' 41
gation of State immunity.
However, Justice White stated that he agreed with Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens that Congress has the constitutional power
to abrogate the states' immunity. In a short paragraph, Justice White stated
that he concurred in this conclusion although he said, "I do not agree with
much of his [Justice Brennan's] reasoning." ' 42 Also, in a footnote, Justice
White stated that he believes that Hans should not be overruled. 43
Justice Scalia's position was exactly the opposite of Justice White's. Justice
Scalia stated that he believes that CERCLA clearly expressed a desire to
impose liability on state governments in federal court. However, he forcefully
argued that Congress should not be able to authorize suits against states
under its commerce power."
Thus, there were five votes that CERCLA permits states to be sued for
monetary liabilities in federal court (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Scalia). There also were five votes that Congress, acting pursuant to its commerce authority, can create such federal court jurisdiction
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White). Additionally,
there were fives vote to reaffirm Hans v. Louisiana, that the eleventh
amendment prevents a state from being sued by its own citizens in federal
court (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Scalia).
A second eleventh amendment case decided last Term was Dellmuth v.
Muth. 45 The issue in Dellmuth was whether states could be sued in federal
court pursuant to the Education of the Handicapped Act, 6 a federal law
that assures that handicapped children may receive a free public education
appropriate for their needs. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
ruled that the Act did not authorize suits against state governments in federal
court. This time, the majority was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. 47
In Dellmuth, the Court reiterated its statement in Atascadero that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit

40. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Congress
may not override the eleventh amendment pursuant to its commerce power). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy agreed with Justice Scalia as to the constitutional
issue. Id.
41. 109 S. Ct. at 2290 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 2295.
43. Id. at 2295 n.8.
44. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
46. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
47. 109 S.Ct. at 2398. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion.
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in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute. '4 The Court said that "evidence of congressional
intent must be both unequivocal and textual. '49 Accordingly, the Court
explained that legislative history is irrelevant and that states could not be
sued under the Education of the Handicapped Act because the statute did
not expressly authorize suits against state governments in federal court. The
dissent argued that Hans should be overruled, but that in any case, the Act
clearly intended that states could be defendants.5 0
In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance' the
Court, again by the same five-to-four margin, held that states could not be
sued in federal court pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "notwithstanding any
assertion of sovereign immunity" any provision of the Code "that contains
'creditor,' 'entity,' or 'governmental unit,' applies to governmental units." '5 2
Moreover, it states that "a determination by the court of an issue arising
under such a provision binds governmental units." 53
Despite this language, the Supreme Court held that the statutory provisions
did not satisfy the standard of an "unmistakably clear" override of sovereign
immunity. 4 The Court interpreted the law as allowing declaratory or injunctive relief against state governments in federal courts, but not money
damages. 5 Moreover, the Court concluded that the legislative history of the
Code was irrelevant because only language in the statute's text matters in
determining whether there is an override of eleventh amendment immunity.
The four dissenting Justices maintained that the Code was sufficiently specific
5 6
in expressing a desire to create state liability in federal court.
57
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court ruled, five-to-three with Justice Marshall not participating, that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award against a state to compensate for delay in
payment.5 In so doing, the Court reaffirmed Hutto v. Finney59 that the

48. Id. at 2400 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
49. Id. at 2401.
50. Id. at 2403 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined
Justice Brennan's dissent. Id.
51. 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989). Justice White announced the judgment of the Court in an
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred. Id.
at 2821. Justice Scalia separately concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2824. Justice Marshall
dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 2824.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988).
53. Id. § 106(c)(2).
54. Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2822 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985)).
55. Id. at 2823.
56. Id. at 2824 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens joined
in the dissent. Id.
57. 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2469 (1989).
58. In addition to the constitutional issue, the state of Missouri argued that the services of
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eleventh amendment does not bar recovery of attorneys' fees from a state
pursuant to a successful civil rights action. Not surprisingly, Justices O'Connor and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented as to the eleventh
amendment issue, contending that such relief against state governments is
barred by the eleventh amendment. 60
In the fifth and final decision, Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police,6' the Court relied on eleventh amendment principles, even though no
eleventh amendment issue was presented. The specific question in Will was
whether states, or state officials acting in their official capacity, could be
sued in state courts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62 Previously, in Quern v.
Jordan,63 the Court ruled that section 1983 does not override the eleventh
amendment. While Quern barred section 1983 litigation against states in
federal court, lower courts were divided as to whether suits were permissible
in state courts that have concurrent jurisdiction to hear section 1983 claims.6
The eleventh amendment only bars litigation in federal courts; it has no
legal effect on state court jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Court said that "in
deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading
of § 1983 that disregards it. ' ' 61 The Court concluded that the eleventh
amendment reflects and embodies state sovereign immunity. Accordingly,
Congress can create state government liability-even in state courts-only

law clerks and paralegals should be compensated at the cost of those services to the attorneys,
rather than at market rates, for purposes of including such services in an award of attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Id. at 2465.
59. 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
60. 109 S. Ct. at 2472 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's opinion, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented as to both the
constitutional and the statutory issues. Id. at 2475.
61. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
62. Id. at 2305.
63. 440 U.S. 332 (1979); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
64. The Supreme Court cited this conflicting authority and the many courts ruling on each
side of this issue. See Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2306 n.3. Compare Harris v. Missouri Court of
Appeals, 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1986) (only local government units considered not to be
part of the state are unprotected by eleventh amendment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986);
Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Illinois, Dep't of Trans., 744 F.2d 1296, 1298 (7th Cir. 1984) ("State
agencies are not 'persons' for purposes of the Civil Rights Act." (quoting Edelberg v. Illinois
Racing Bd., 540 F.2d 279, 281 n.2 (7th Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Ruiz
v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1137 (5th Cir. 1982) (Congress did not intend to override states'
immunity), modified on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1042 (1983); Aubuchon v. Missouri, 631 F.2d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) ("Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is directed at individuals acting under color of state law, not individual states.")
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 915 (1981) with Della Grotta v. Rhode Island,
781 F.2d 343, 349 (1st Cir. 1986) (state is a "person" within meaning of section 1983 and may
be subject to same liability as municipalities and local governmental units); Gay Student Servs.
v. Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d 160, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1980) (college does not have absolute
section 1983 immunity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980).
65. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2309.
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by clearly expressing a desire to impose such costs on the states.6 Because
section 1983 does not explicitly say that states can be sued in state court,

no such suits are allowed. Will, again, was a five-to-four decision, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
67
comprising the majority.

What does all of this mean to the law of the eleventh amendment? First,
it now is clearly settled that five members of the Court are unwilling to
overrule Hans v. Louisiana.68 Throughout this decade, four Justices and

many scholars have argued that Hans should be overruled and that the
eleventh amendment should be understood only as a restriction on suits
grounded solely in diversity theory. 69 If this view was adopted, then states

could be sued in federal court under any federal claims. For example, there
would be no bar to suits against states for alleged constitutional violations.
After the Court was evenly divided in Welch, there seemed a real possibility
that Hans might be overturned. 70 But the recent decisions resolve this question
and reaffirm that the eleventh amendment precludes suits against a state by
its own citizens. In fact, Will reveals that the Court will aggressively protect
71
state governments from liability under federal law.
Second, the decisions during the 1988-89 Term establish that Congress can
likely override the eleventh amendment pursuant to any of its powers. If

Congress desires to eliminate state sovereign immunity, it is not limited to
acting under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Court
has authorized suits only pursuant to Congress' commerce power, 72 the

Court's reasoning justifies permitting Congress to override the eleventh
amendment pursuant to any of its constitutional powers.
Third, except when it is acting under Section 5 of the fourteenth amend-

ment, Congress can create state government liability only by an explicit,

66. Id. at 2310.
67. Id. at 2305 (Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court); id. at 2312 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined the dissent. Id.
68. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2299 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
refused to overturn Hans. See id. at 2295 n.8 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
White also refused to overturn Hans. Id. at 2289.
69. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1087-91 (arguing for diversity theory of the eleventh
amendment); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 70 (arguing in favor of overruling Hans); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 252-58 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (effect of Court's
doctrine is to insulate states that violate federal law from the consequences of their conduct).
70. See E. CHSEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 367-68 (discussing future of the eleventh amendment in light of split on the Court).
71. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
72. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2281 (1989) (reading Court's prior
decisions as having recognized congressional "authority to abrogate States' immunity from suit
when legislating pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by the Constitution."). The plurality
opinion relied on the commerce clause's displacement of state power. Id. at 2284. It also relied
on the "conclusion that, in approving the commerce power, the States consented to suits against
them based on congressionally created causes of action." Id. at 2285.
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clear, unmistakable statement in the text of the law." The legislative history
and even the law's overall structure are irrelevant; the sole question is whether
the text expressly authorizes such suits. The rejection of state liability in
Dellmuth and Hoffman, despite strong support for federal court jurisdiction
in the statutes' text and legislative history, indicate that only a very explicit,
truly unmistakable statutory provision warrants state liability in federal court.
However, one reaffirmation of Hutto which held that section 1988 overrides
the eleventh amendment without a clear statement in its text, reveals that a
different standard is used for laws adopted under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. For laws enacted pursuant to this provision, an expression of
intent in the text of the legislative history is sufficient.
II.

CONGRESS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT:

Do THE RULES MAKE

SENSE?

Many scholars have criticized other aspects of eleventh amendment law as
being based on fictions and indefensible distinctions.14 I contend that the
recent decisions only exacerbate the confusion and the unsatisfactory state
of the law in this area. The Court has defined Congress' power to override
the eleventh amendment in a way that makes little sense. Regardless of one's
ideology, the Court's compromises have created legal doctrines that are
undesirable. Specifically, I contend that the "clear statement rule" that is
the core of the current law concerning congressional authority to abrogate
the eleventh amendment is unjustified in theory and is applied in an unduly
restrictive manner.
A.

Is the "Clear Statement Rule" Justified?

First, the current law concerning congressional authority to create state
liability is inconsistent with the views of at least eight of the Justices. As
described above, the Court repeatedly held that Congress may override the
eleventh amendment only if it does so in "unmistakably clear" language in
the text of a statute. 7 Yet, this principle is at odds with the position of
almost every member of the Court.

73. For a discussion of the "clear statement rule" in the 1988-89 Term cases, see notes 3067 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 3-4, 13 & n.56 (the concept of state immunity
contradicts other fundamental constitutional principles); Massey, supra note 1,at 69 ("doctrines
and fictions" serve to protect against state infringement upon federal rights); Shapiro, supra

note 1, at 66-71, 69 (rather than deciding Hans as it did, the Supreme Court, "[w]ith ample
justification in history and precedent .. . could have held the eleventh amendment applicable
only when jurisdiction was based on the identity of the parties and not when the claim was
grounded on .federal law").
75. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2400 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income

Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2822 (quoting same phrase from Atascadero).

1989]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

333

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
believe that Congress should not be able to override eleventh amendment
immunity, except for laws adopted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 76 In other words, these Justices maintain that no matter how
explicit the statutory provision, Congress should not be able to create state
liability in federal court under constitutional provisions such as the commerce
clause and the bankruptcy power.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens believe that the eleventh amendment does not bar suits against states when jurisdiction is based
on a federal question; the provision only applies to bar suits when jurisdiction
is based solely on diversity of citizenship. These Justices have explained that
"[i]f federal jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question or
some other clause of Article III, however, the Eleventh Amendment has no
relevance."17 7 The Justices reason that the text of the eleventh amendment
only refers to suits by citizens of other states and countries and that the
drafters' intent was to modify the clause in article III that authorized diversity
suits against state governments.78 Therefore, for Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, states may be sued in federal court any time there
is federal question jurisdiction. There is no need for a special congressional
declaration of a desire to create state liability.
Hence, eight Justices reject the clear statement rule. For the conservative
members of the Court, no statutory provision (except for those enacted
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment), regardless of its clarity, can
override the eleventh amendment. For the more liberal Justices, any federal
question is sufficient to create federal court jurisdiction over claims against
states, regardless of whether the statute explicitly authorizes suits against
state governments.
At most then, the clear statement rule reflects Justice White's view and
has come to be the current law through an unusual compromise. Yet, Justice
White has avoided explaining his position. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co. he cryptically said that he agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion that
laws adopted under the commerce power could override the eleventh amendment, but he disagreed with most of Justice Brennan's reasoning. 79 In both
76. See Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2299-302 (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's
opinion as to the constitutional issue. Id. at 2295.
77. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J.,dissenting)
(Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion).
78. Id. at 247-302 (Brennan, J.,dissenting); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 497 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the eleventh "[a]mendment bars
only actions against a State by citizens of another State or of a foreign nation."). See also
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1034 (view of the eleventh amendment as a "form of jurisdictional
bar" is mistaken); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1894 (eleventh amendment nothing more than "a
narrow and technical redefinition of the two jurisdictional clauses of article III that grant
jurisdiction over suits between a state and another state's citizens or foreign citizens."); L.
Marshall, supra note 1, at 1342 (arguing for diversity theory of the eleventh amendment).
79. 109 S. Ct. 2289, 2295 (White, J.,concurring in the judgment).
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Hoffman0 and Union Gas, Justice White applied the clear statement rule,
citing to earlier cases that briefly explained that out of respect for state
sovereignty Congress can authorize suits against states only in "unmistakably
clear language.'"'8
But a crucial step is missing in this argument: why does respect for state
sovereignty justify the clear statement rule? The answer to this question is
not obvious or intuitive because no matter how great the concern for state
sovereignty, the clear statement rule is inconsistent with the most prominent
theories of the eleventh amendment. At this point, the two most widely
accepted accounts of the amendment are the sovereign immunity and the
diversity theories. The clear statement rule for state liability is at odds with
both of these theories.
One theory is that sovereign immunity creates a constitutional restriction
on all types of federal court subject matter jurisdiction, precluding federal
courts from hearing any suits against state governments. By this view, the
eleventh amendment is part of a broader constitutional limitation on federal
court jurisdiction created by sovereign immunity. The state governments'
sovereign immunity pre-existed the Constitution and survived the adoption
of article III and the eleventh amendment. The eleventh amendment and
Hans v. Louisiana are reflcctions of the states' immunity to suits. The
Supreme Court has declared that the eleventh amendment "affirm[s] that
the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial
''s2
authority in Art. III.
But if sovereign immunity, and the eleventh amendment, are constitutional
limits on federal court jurisdiction, then Congressional statutes cannot override the Constitution and authorize suits against states. The clear statement
rule is inconsistent with the sovereign immunity theory because any congressional attempt to impose liability on states-no matter how explicitly
stated-is unconstitutional. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, recognized this when he wrote in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.:
[I]nstead of cleaning up the allegedly muddled Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence produced by Hans, the Court leaves that in place, and adds
to the clutter the astounding principle that Article III limitations can be
overcome by simply exercising Article I powers. It is an unstable victory
as well, since that principle is too much at war with itself to endure.83
An alternative view of the eleventh amendment treats it as restricting only
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.8 4 As explained above, under

80. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2822 (1989)
("unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
81. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2289 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Welch
v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1983)).
82. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).
83. 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2303 (Scalia J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1130 ("adopters of the amendment had the more
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this theory, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear suits against state governments when there is federal question jurisdiction . 5 Because the eleventh
amendment is seen as barring only suits when jurisdiction is based solely on
diversity of citizenship, there is no need for a clear statement in order for
federal courts to hear suits against state governments.
These are certainly not the only theories of the eleventh amendment.
Justice White could draw on alternative explanations in defending the clear
statement rule. For example, Professors John Nowak and Lawrence Tribe
wrote articles contending that the eleventh amendment is a limit on the
federal judiciary's power, not on Congress' authority.8 6 Both argue that
questions of federalism are best resolved through the political process;
therefore, Congress should have authority to balance federal and state
interests and, where necessary, create state liability in federal court.17 Alternatively, Professors Vicki Jackson and Martha Field have written articles
contending that the eleventh amendment should be understood as reflecting
a common law principle of sovereign immunity that can be overridden by
statutes .88
But the point is that the clear statement rule is inconsistent with the
theories endorsed by eight of the current Justices and Justice White has not
defended it in terms of other accounts of the eleventh amendment. It is not
that a defense is impossible, just that it has not yet been provided. This
omission is particularly troubling because the clear statement rule is the
current law and the justification for it matters in defining other aspects of
eleventh amendment law. As the deciding vote on an important and deeply

modest purpose of requiring that the state-citizen diversity clause of article III be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts only when a state sued an out-of-state citizen.");
Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1893 (defending the diversity theory).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
86. See Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413 (1975); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV. L.REV. 682
(1976).
87. For a criticism of the Nowak and Tribe positions, see Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1260 (1978) (Nowak and Tribe "show nothing in either the language
or the history of the amendment" to support a dichotomy between judicial and legislative
power).
88. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 6, 75-84 (state sovereign immunity not derived from
Constitution but is part of federal common law, subject to Congressional application); Field,
supra note 87, at 1261-78 (correct historical interpretation is that sovereign immunity is common
law doctrine rather than constitutionally required, subject to congressional modification, as well
as development by federal courts with respect for balance between federal and state power).
Professor Field concluded: "Surely it is preferable to arrive directly at these results by following
the theory of the eleventh amendment allowing modification of sovereign immunity by usual
common law processes, than to overread and underread the eleventh amendment's language as
the Court's own approach has forced it to do." Id. at 1280.
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contested constitutional question, Justice White had the responsibility to
provide some inkling as to his reasoning and views.
B.

Has the "Clear Statement Rule" Been
Applied in a Sensible Fashion?

On its own terms, putting aside the question of whether it is theoretically
justified or reflects the Justices' views, the clear statement rule followed in
eleventh amendment cases is a unique interpretive canon. In fact, it is one
that makes little jurisprudential sense.
In other constitutional areas, the Court has insisted that Congress provide
a "clear statement" before the judiciary would enforce a legislative policy. s9
Yet, the clear statement requirement used in eleventh amendment cases is
much more demanding. Justice Brennan explained that "[w]here the Eleventh
Amendment applies, the Court has devised a clear-statement principle more
robust than its requirement of clarity in any other situation." 9 There is a
"uniquely daunting requirement of clarity in Eleventh Amendment cases." 9'
The clear statement rule used in eleventh amendment cases is unique
because of the Court's unwillingness to interpret statutes based on their
overall structure or legislative history. Only explicit language in the statute
is sufficient. However, even when such language exists, the Court often
interprets it as inadequate to authorize suits against state governments.
For example, in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance,9" the Court considered a statute that authorized suits against states
in unmistakable terms. Section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code states that

89. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (in
holding that Congress did not, in section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 1975 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)),
impose an obligation on the states to spend state funds to provide specific types of treatment
as a condition of receiving federal funds, the Court said, "Congress must express clearly its
intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly
decide whether or not to accept those funds."), later proceedings, Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (eleventh amendment bars pendent state law claims against state officers in federal court);
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974). In holding that 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970),
which prohibits judicial review of decisions of Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, does not
bar federal court review of constitutional challenge to veterans' benefits legislation, the Court
stated, "neither the text nor the scant legislative history of § 211(a) provides the 'clear and
convincing' evidence of congressional intent required by this Court before a statute will be
construed to restrict access to judicial review." 415 U.S. at 373-74. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987). In upholding 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985), which directs
the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states
allowing persons less than twenty-one years of age to purchase alcohol, the Court stated, "[t]he
conditions upon which States receive the funds ... could not be more clearly stated by
Congress." Id.
90. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2314 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 2314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. 109 S.Ct. 2818, 2822 (1989) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1982)).
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"notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity," any Code provision
referring to "creditor," "entity," or "governmental unit," applies to the
states. 93 The Code expressly stated that states were to be bound by the
determinations of bankruptcy courts.9 4 In fact, the legislative history of the
Code contained declarations from members of Congress that they intended
to create the "express waiver of sovereign immunity" needed to be effective. 9
But despite such clear textual language and intent, the Court concluded
that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize suits against states for monetary
damages. The Court reasoned that section 106(c) authorizes declaratory and

injunctive relief, but not monetary recovery from a state. 96 However, the

language of the statute does not draw this distinction. 97 Rather, the Code
could not be more explicit in its override of sovereign immunity. Moreover,
if there are ambiguities in a statute's language, legislative history is traditionally used in its interpretation. The legislative history of section 106
strongly supports the view that Congress intended to create state liability. 98

But the Court dismissed this legislative history because it believed that only
the textual language was relevant in determining whether a statute overrides
the eleventh amendment. 99
Similarly, in Dellmuth v. Muth,'0° the Court refused to allow suits against

states in federal court pursuant to the Education of the Handicapped Act,' 0'
despite statutory language and intent justifying such litigation. The Act

creates many obligations on the part of state governments that receive federal
funds. 021 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Act "confers
upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public education

in participating States and conditions federal financial assistance upon a

93. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c)(1) (1988).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2) (1988) ("a determination by this court of an issue arising under
such a provision binds governmental units.").
95. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,993 (statement

of Sen. DeConcini), quoted in Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S.
Ct. 2818, 2825 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2823.

97. See id. at 2825 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98.
106).
99.
100.
101.
Under

See id. at 2827-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the legislative history of section
Id. at 2823-24.
109 S. Ct. 2397, 2401-02 (1989).
84 Stat. 175 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
section 1415(e)(2), parties aggrieved by the administrative process may "bring a civil

action .. .in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United
States without regard to the amount in controversy." Id.
102. To be eligible for federal funds under the Act, a state must develop and provide for
the education of all handicapped children, assure that all applicable requirements of the Act

are carried out, and "where a local education authority cannot or will not provide appropriate
educational services to the handicapped, the State will do so directly." Dellmuth, 109 S. Ct.
at 2403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the Act."' 13
The statute expressly authorizes any aggrieved party to bring suit in either
federal or state court." ° Because so much of the statute is directed at state
governments, it is likely that the statute's drafters assumed that aggrieved
individuals often would be directing their litigation against state governments.
In fact, the legislative history contains express declarations of an intent to
allow suits against state governments. 105 Again, the majority opinion dismissed the legislative history saying that it was irrelevant to determining
1°6
whether Congress intended to override the eleventh amendment.
Thus, the Court's approach to congressional statutes is quite unusual in
eleventh amendment cases. The Court strains to interpret even clear language,
like in Hoffman,107 as ambiguous. The Court does not consider the overall
structure and purpose of the statute in deciding whether Congress intended
0
to abrogate sovereign immunity. For example, in Dellmuth, 1°
the statute's
repeated imposition of duties on state governments justified the conclusion
that state liability was intended. Moreover, the Court eschews a traditional
source of guidance in resolving ambiguity, legislative history. In other words,
the Court goes out of its way to read statutes as ambiguous in their intent
to create state liability. The conclusion of ambiguity by itself precludes
abrogation of the eleventh amendment because the Court refuses to use any
sources that might resolve the uncertainty in favor of allowing states to be
sued.
Nor is it explained why legislative history cannot be used to aid interpretation and resolve ambiguities, like it is in all other areas of statutory
construction. The Court's justification is tautological. The Court says that
"if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative
history will be futile, because by definition the rule . . . will not be met."' 1 9
But this simply says that legislative history is rejected because it is not the
text.
The question is: why should the Court not use legislative history as part
of its determination of congressional intent, especially when the text is
ambiguous? If the Court's true objective is following congressional intent,
then it should look to all available evidence. Even if the Court insists on

103. Id. at 2404 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988)
(emphasis in original)).
104. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)). See supra note 101.
105. See 109 S. Ct. at 2404 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Senator Williams, 121 CONG.
REc. 37,415 (1975)) ("it should be clear that a parent or guardian may present a complaint
alleging that a State or local educational agency has refused to provide services to which a
child may be entitled or alleging that a State or local educational agency has erroneously
classified a child as a handicapped child.").
106. Id. at 2401. See infra text at note 109.
107. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2822 (1989)
(interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988)).
108. Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2401.
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unmistakable expressions of such intent, the Court should be willing to find
such clarity on the basis of text, legislative history, and the overall design
of the statute. From reading the cases, one gets the cynical impression that
the conservative members of the Court want to preclude state liability in
federal court and therefore do all they can to interpret the laws to prevent
such suits. They consistently interpret the statutes to lack a sufficiently
explicit authorization and they refuse to look to the legislative history because
of the likelihood that it would allow the litigation against state governments.
III.

MAKING SENSE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Ultimately, whether the "clear statement rule" makes sense and whether
it is applied in a desirable manner depends on the underlying theory of the
eleventh amendment. As explained earlier, from the perspective of the sovereign immunity and diversity theories-held by eight members of the Courtthe clear statement rule is indefensible, but alternative theories advanced by
academics could be used to justify the approach. Likewise, the degree of
clarity required of Congress turns on the theory chosen. The key question
is what does the eleventh amendment mean. Not surprisingly, all of the
issues concerning the interpretation of the amendment ultimately turn on
this question.
For example, a crucial question in applying the eleventh amendment is
whether Hans v. Louisiana was correct in holding that suits against state
governments by their own citizens are barred by the eleventh amendment."10
This, too, depends on the underlying theory one uses for understanding the
eleventh amendment; Hans is justified by the sovereign immunity approach,
but inconsistent with the diversity theory.
The eleventh amendment, of course, only speaks of suits by citizens of
other states or of foreign countries. Hans, and its contemporary validation,
are based on the notion that the Framers of the Constitution intended that
the states would retain their sovereign immunity, even when sued for violating
the Constitution. In Hans, the Court declared that "the cognizance of suits
and actions [against unconsenting States] was not contemplated by the
Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.""'

110. This question, of course, has been the focus of much scholarship on the eleventh
amendment. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1039 ("The [Hans] Court was careful to say
that the eleventh amendment itself did not require [the] result" of barring suit by a state's
citizen against the state); L. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1343 ("Like Hans, both the diversity
and the congressional abrogation theories are thoroughly unfaithful to the essentially unambiguous dictates of the [eleventh] amendment's language.") (footnote omitted); Shapiro, supra
note 1, at 70 ("the rationale of [Hans], if not the result, should be regarded as an unforced
error-a choice that was neither required nor fruitful.") (footnote omitted). Cf. W. Marshall,
supra note 1, at 1375 (diversity theorists' historical analysis is inadequate basis for overruling
Hans).
111. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890), quoted in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
109 S. Ct. 2273, 2297 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In Union Gas, Justice Scalia wrote of "a consensus that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the Federal Government, was
part of the understood background against which the Constitution was
adopted.' 1 2 In other words, the Court justifies its theory and its result
entirely based on historical interpretation.
But this means that principles nowhere mentioned in the Constitution
supersede even textual provisions. For example, the position taken by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy is that state
sovereign immunity limits congressional powers under article I of the Constitution and restricts judicial power under article III."' 3
At minimum, to say that a nontextual principle is of greater significance
than the text seems at odds with the supremacy clause of article VI, that
declares the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land. Moreover, this
position is based on the assumption that the Framers' intent is more important than textual provisions. This is a curious premise when the Court
simultaneously insists that in interpreting statutes, legislative intent deserves
no weight and only the text matters."14 In fact, a belief in natural rights and
natural law also was part of the "understood background" to the Constitution." 5 If the Framers' unwritten convictions are to be enforced by the
Court, then is the Court obligated to implement their belief in natural law
as well?
Most importantly, the Court's position that sovereign immunity was intended by the Framers and therefore limits congressional and judicial power
has focused the debate over the eleventh amendment in a manner that is, at
best, unhelpful and at worst disingenuous. Both the majority and the dissent
have centered their attention on lengthy examinations of what the drafters
of article III and the eleventh amendment intended with regard to state
sovereign immunity. 16 Similarly, scholars supporting the diversity theory

112. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2297 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 2301. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in this
part of Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. at 2295.
114. The Court implicitly is drawing a distinction between interpreting the Constitution and
statutes, with intent mattering for the former, but not the latter. At the very least, this is a
difference that needs to be acknowledged and defended.
115. See, e.g., Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HA.v. L. REv. 149, 153 (1928) (legality and supremacy of the Constitution are based on
"the belief in a law superior to the will of human governors."); Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985) (authors of the Constitution were
influenced by the British Protestant belief that the Bible's text was the only legitimate law and
that human interpretation of it corrupted its "true" meaning, combined with the Enlightenment's
general disdain for obscure, strictly-enforced legal rules); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1127, 1134 (1987) ("[b]y the 1780s . . . the 'Constitution' of
an American state consisted of its fundamental law (both positive and natural), the inherent
and inalienable rights of man . . . and the . . . governmental mixture that would best protect
and preserve the fundamental law and natural rights.").
116. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2296-2302 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the eleventh amendment was not
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largely attempt to defend this view based on the text and the Framers'
intent,"17 while academics who support the Court's position attempt to
establish it on the same basis."' In other words, the crucial underlying issue
of what theory best explains the eleventh amendment is debated almost
entirely in originalist terms of the text and the Framers' intent.
But this begs the question as to whether the Framers' intent should control
constitutional interpretation. At the very least, an impressive body of literature over the past decade has challenged such an approach to constitutional
law.11 9 For example, scholars have argued that originalist interpretation lacks
a normative justification'20 and that it self-destructs because the Framers did
not intend that their views would control future interpretation. 2 Furthermore, scholars have argued that Framers intent does not exist in any meaningful sense because of the problems of deciding whose intent matters (the
drafters? the Convention or Congress? the ratifiers?) and which of their
views count. 12 2 Undoubtedly, different participants in the process of adopting

intended to provide a complete description of sovereign immunity, while article III's jurisdictional grants did not automatically eliminate it); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496-521 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's reliance
on the framers' intent, because that intent was ambiguous, and because reliance on it leads to
results contrary to the Constitution's actual language).
117. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1060 ("The narrowness of the [eleventh] amendment's
coverage and its congruence with the affirmative authorization in article III of state-citizen
diversity jurisdiction suggest strongly that . . . [it was not intended] to create a general state
sovereign immunity protection"); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1894 ("The [eleventh] amendment
was the product of a unique set of political circumstances, and reflects more the foreign policy
concerns and political compromises of the Federalist era than it does any broad desire to
constitutionalize a doctrine of state sovereign immunity."); L. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1371
("Legal scholars have attempted to construct grand historical theories about the amendment
without relying on the strongest piece of direct evidence of its framers' and supporters' actual
intent-the text that they drafted and for which they voted.").
118. See, e.g., W. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1375 ("The ninety-nine years of jurisprudence
built upon [Hans v. Louisiana] creates a presumption in favor of the current interpretation of
state immunity. Review of the historical evidence and arguments, in turn, establishes that the
diversity theorists have not overcome the presumption.").
119. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204, 205 (1980) (neither strict textualism nor strict intentionalism forms an adequate basis
for making constitutional decisions; in many instances the best approach is one which utilizes
nonoriginalist theories); Shaman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Creativity, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 257, 277 (1982) (nonoriginalist, creative theories are more useful to lend
meaning to the Constitution in light of current situations than the text and framers' intent).
120. See, e.g., Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1511 (1985) (one who attempts to "enter
the minds" of the framers to report how they would have resolved a given situation "will be
more than a bit affected by the enterer's own predispositions.").
121. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 115, at 948 (early interpretations of the Constitution based
their reasoning about its text and extant methods of statutory construction, not based on the
personal views of the framers).
122. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 482-83 (1981)
(the myriad of participants involved, each possessing a unique, indeterminate psychological
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and amending the Constitution had varying understandings and desires.
The debate over the meaning of the eleventh amendment illustrates this
perfectly. Both sides can marshal quotations from the Framers to support
their respective positions.121 All this proves is that the Framers' disagreed on
this issue. Even if Framers' intent deserves authoritative status in constitutional interpretation, the question of how the eleventh amendment should
be understood cannot be resolved in terms of the Framers' views. The
language of the eleventh amendment and the Framers intent can be used to
support the sovereign immunity theory or the diversity theory or others as
well. All of the attention to history by both sides of the debate seems
misplaced and ultimately unhelpful.
In fact, the reliance on the text and the Framers' intent seems disingenuous.
Conservative members of the Court think that preserving state sovereign
immunity is more important than allowing suits against states in federal
court to redress violations of the Constitution and federal laws. Therefore,
they use history to support their restrictive interpretation. More liberal
Justices have an opposite position, believing that assuring state compliance
with federal law is more important than upholding state sovereign immunity.
Accordingly, they cite textual and historical evidence to support this position.
The real issue, then, is not what the Framers' may have thought, but
rather, what is the appropriate role of state sovereign immunity in the
American system of government? Under what circumstances does sovereign
immunity justify limiting state government accountability and when should
states be liable in federal court? Yet relatively little attention has focused
124
directly on these underlying value questions.
Justice Scalia, in his conclusion in Union Gas, remarked that "[tihe Court's
holding today can be applauded only by those who think state sovereign
immunity so constitutionally insignificant that Hans itself might as well be
abandoned.'1 25 But he offered no defense, apart from history, for why

state, makes this determination virtually impossible); Brest, supra note 119, at 214 ("If the
only way a judge could ascertain institutional intent were to count individual intention-votes,
her task would be impossible even with respect to a single multimember law-making body, and
a fortiori where the assent of several such bodies were required."); Shaman, supra note 119,
at 267 (there is no basis to hold the intentions of those who drafted the Constitution superior
to the intentions of those who ratified it and those who continue to uphold it); Wofford, The
Blinding Light: The Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502,
509 (1964) (the Constitution was collectively drafted, ratified, and amended by so many people
that "to admit the relevance of such a large number of states of mind is to set forth a task
virtually impossible to fulfill.").
123. Compare Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 480-85
(1987) (arguing that the Framers intended to preserve sovereign immunity) with Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the framers did not intend to exempt states from all suits by private citizens).
124. The resolution of these issues is best reserved for later law review articles.
125. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2303 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

19891

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

sovereign immunity justifies limiting the power of Congress and the federal
courts. Likewise, Justice Stevens remarked in a concurring opinion that
"federal courts 'have a primary obligation to protect the rights of the
individual that are embodied in the Federal Constitution' and laws .... and
generally should not eschew this responsibility based on some diffuse, instrumental concern for state autonomy."' 26 But that was the extent of an
attempt to analyze and resolve the conflict between state accountability and
state immunity in nonhistorical terms.
I contend that the discussion of the eleventh amendment should shift
completely away from historical exegesis and focus entirely on the underlying
values of holding the states liable and of preserving the states' immunity.
For example, those, such as myself, who believe that Hans should be
overruled should defend this position based on the desirability of assuring
state compliance with federal law and the inappropriateness of sovereign
immunity in the American system of government. 27 Those who wish to
defend Hans must do so by justifying sovereign immunity and explaining
why it deserves primacy over constitutional enforcement.
Ultimately, I believe that only such a candid approach to the eleventh
amendment can resolve the doctrinal mess in the area. The fictions and
distinctions are criticized by virtually everyone. Hopefully, discussion and
decisions 'focused on the real matters in issue can lead to a more coherent
set of principles. For example, if the Justices believe that states should be
liable for injunctive relief, but not monetary judgments, they should articulate and defend this. No longer would it be necessary to rely on the fictional
distinction created in Ex parte Young.' 21 Moreover, if the Justices openly
expressed and justified this view it could then be debated. By focusing on
history, when it is not really history that is in dispute, the Court has directed
the discussion in an unproductive and unhelpful manner.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The cases decided this past Term repeatedly saw Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens arguing against state sovereign immunity and
interpreting federal statutes to allow suits against state governments in federal
court. At the same time, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy expressed their belief in state sovereign immunity
and repeatedly interpreted federal statutes as lacking a sufficiently clear

126. Id. at 2288 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1045
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

127. See, e.g., Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984
SUp. CT. REV. 149, 168 ("Sovereign immunity [is] an unattractive doctrine that does not belong
in an enlightened constitution.").
128. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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statement to abrogate the eleventh amendment. 2 9 The consistency in the
Justices' positions demonstrates that the actual disagreement on the Court
is over the relative importance of state immunity as opposed to state accountability in federal court. After a decade of unsatisfying decisions and
unresolvable academic debate about the eleventh amendment, it is time finally
to focus on what the dispute is really all about.

129. The primary exception was Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2295-96
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where Justice Scalia concluded
that the statute was sufficiently specific to justify state liability. See supra text accompanying
notes 30-44.

